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Abstract: It seems that from an epistemological point of view comparative probability has many advantages with respect to a probability measure. It is more reasonable as an evaluation of degrees of rational beliefs. It allows the formulation of a comparative indifference principle free from well known paradoxes. Moreover it makes it possible to weaken the principal principle, so that it becomes more reasonable. But the logical systems of comparative probability do not admit an adequate probability updating, which on the contrary is possible for a probability measure. Therefore we are faced with a true epistemological dilemma between comparative and quantitative probability.


1. In recent​[1]​ times a partially logical perspective on probability has come back into fashion​[2]​. The deepest modern formulation of this concept is certainly that of Keynes, 1921. Elsewhere (Fano, 1999) I showed that Carnap’s logical approach (1950), which attempts to distance Keynes’ reference to the concept of intuition, is forced towards a weakening, both from a formal and epistemological point of view, which results in a more complex position, closer to that of the Treatise author (Carnap, 1968). Here I would like to retrieve a Keynesian perspective concerning two aspects: first, moving from the datum that most probabilistic evaluations are comparative, not quantitative​[3]​; second, naturalizing the procedures of ascription of initial probabilities, coming back beyond Keynes to von Kries, 1886, as has been recently presented by Heidelberger, 2001​[4]​.

2. We would all agree that Newton’s gravitation​[5]​ law is more confirmed than the astral influences on our character and behaviours. In spite of this it is not easy to quantify such a difference as a degree of confirmation. Similarly, given the relative frequencies of fatal accidents during car and train journeys, it seems rational to believe that one is more likely to die by car than by train. Nevertheless the difference in probability is difficult to establish with exactitude. 

3. Ever since the pioneer work of John Maynard Keynes (Keynes, 1921), people have attempted to find a logic of rational beliefs; these are in most cases neither certainly true, nor certainly false. Beliefs are to be expressed by means of sentences, so our first problem is to establish what it means that a certain sentence has a certain probability of being true. After Kolmogorov, we know that a probability measure on a set E is a function p, which ascribes a real number belonging to [0,1] to every subset e of E, in such a way that p(E)=1, p()=0 and if a,b belong to E and their intersection is empty, then . If E is a set of sentences, then, if e is a logical truth, p(e)=1, if it is a contradiction, p(e)=0, if a and b are incompatible, . But, as we saw in the preceding examples, it is quite difficult to assign a quantitative probability to our rational beliefs, when they concern the truth of both scientific and common sentences. In the following we will come back to this point. 





It is possible to prove that if p(h) is a probability measure, then p(h/e) is a probability measure as well.

5. If we consider probability as a measure of the degree of rational belief, it seems more sensible to maintain that the conditioned probability is epistemologically primary with respect to absolute probability, because our beliefs are always based on one or more evidences, which we are making use of for our cognitive evaluation. However, from the logical point of view, if we move from conditioned probability, it is easy to define the absolute probability of a sentence as the conditioned probability with respect to a logical truth. We will be returning to this point as well in the following.

6. Before going on, we emphasize that degrees of rational belief are to be intended as probabilities that the sentence being considered is true, not as situations of objective indeterminacy. The probabilities we are investigating are, as it were, de dicto, not de re.





In this equation e is a new evidence and h is the hypothesis we are investigating. In this context p(h) is already a conditioned probability with respect to the old evidence. 
On the other hand, the application of Bayes’ theorem presupposes that the initial probabilities are already known, i.e. first of all the probability of h given the old evidences must be known. Thus we return to the problem we posed at the beginning, that of establishing a probability given certain evidences. 

8. From the examples we proposed it seems that it is often possible to establish a comparison between probabilities, but not to determine their quantitative value. Indeed there are few cases where the probability can be evaluated quantitatively: gambles, some very simple empirical situations and little else. In general, as regards the confirmation of scientific hypotheses, it seems unreasonable to ascribe a probability measure to it, whereas it is often possible to establish that a hypothesis is more probable than another. The same holds for evaluations concerning the common world. In the second chapter of his Treatise, Keynes provides a series of arguments favouring the qualitative character of probability evaluations. He observes​[6]​ that, even for brokers, who determine premiums quantitatively on the basis of statistics, it is enough for the premium to exceed the probability of the accident occurring multiplied by the amount to be paid by the insurance. Therefore they have to establish only that the probability of the disaster happening is lower than a certain value. Furthermore, he continues​[7]​, although it is true that a favourable evidence increases the probability of a certain hypothesis, it is difficult to determine by how much the latter increases.
In order to portray the relation between probabilities, Keynes uses an interesting picture​[8]​ in which the impossibility (probability=0) and certitude (probability=1) are two points of the plane connected by different lines, of which one is straight and represents a probability measure, whereas the others are curves, which sometimes intersect one another. A quantitative probability (straight line) can be ascribed only in a few cases. In general probabilities are only comparative, i.e. curved lines. Furthermore a comparison is possible only between probabilities which both lie on the same curved line. Therefore, in general, probabilities are neither measurable, nor comparable. They are measurable in only a very few cases and in only slightly more are they comparable. 
According to Keynes​[9]​, it is certainly possible to compare probability only in the following cases:

I.  e 
II.  e 

That is: I. when the two probabilities have the same evidence, but the hypothesis is enlarged; II. when the two probabilities have the same hypothesis and the evidence is augmented. This limitation seems excessive, because, though it is not possible to compare probabilities from completely different realms, it is possible to compare probabilities which cannot be traced back to the above-mentioned patterns. For instance, given the relative frequencies of accidents by car and plane, we can reasonably maintain that we are more likely to die by the first than by the second. This comparison is neither of the first nor the second kind, nor can it be traced back to them. We will return to this problem as well.

9. Now we shall investigate how the probabilities in cases I. and II. are modified. Many axiomatizations of comparative probability are available​[10]​, i.e. axiomatizations of a probability relation which is a total order (viz. reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive and linear). However they are not applicable in this context because here linearity is not satisfied, since from an epistemological point of view not all probabilities are comparable. Nevertheless we assume we have found a set of sentences Z for which all probabilities are comparable. Then we can ask what happens to the probabilities whenever the hypothesis or the evidence augments. The first case is very simple, because a proposition of this kind may always be derived from the axioms of comparative probability.

If between two probabilities p(a/b) and p(c/d) the hypothesis a of the first is deducible from the hypothesis c of the second, then p(a/b)p(c/d).





Keynes analyses the second case in the following way.
In case II. comparison is possible if c contains only one further information that is relevant for the hypothesis a. According to the following definition, the evidence c is monorelevant​[11]​ for a in the language Z, iff in Z two sentences b and d such that ,  and  do not exist.













All this seems very sensible, but it is not deducible from the current axioms of comparative probability. Indeed it is possible to find counterexamples to such rules. Let us consider as universe of discourse the inhabitants of Great Britain, who are partitioned in two categories: English and Scottish​[12]​. Let us assume that all English males wear trousers, whereas English females wear skirts and, vice versa, that all Scottish males wear skirts and Scottish females wear trousers. Furthermore males and females are equinumerous in both populations. Let us suppose also that there are more English than Scots. We indicate:

with a  x wears a skirt
with c  x is female
with b  x is Scottish

Hence the first case is satisfied, i.e. if x is female she is more likely to wear a skirt than trousers, since there are more English than Scots. However if we add to the evidence “x is Scottish” that she is female, the probability that she wears a skirt does not increase but becomes 0, contrary to what Keynes hypothesised​[13]​.
In other words, even if an evidence b is monorelevant for and favourable to a certain hypothesis a, it is not certain that b increases the probability of a together with other evidences. In fact axioms of comparative probability do not support principles suitable for determining an updating of probabilities when the evidence is augmented. 

10. As far as we know, it is possible to establish a principle — Bayes’ theorem — which rules the updating of probability if the evidence is augmented only when there is a probability measure. Therefore we are faced with a painful dilemma:

Though it is epistemologically more reasonable to deal with most probabilities in comparative terms, we have not yet been able to define a qualitative updating of probability. On the contrary an updating of probability is possible only if the latter is quantitative. Nonetheless it is reasonable to maintain that only cases very simple from the cognitive point of view allow a reasonable application of a probability measure.

It seems that if this dilemma is not resolved, the value of the concept of probability, intended as an evaluation of degree of rational belief, loses part of its epistemological relevance.

11. Now we will return briefly to the problem of the relation between conditioned and absolute probability. We saw that if p is a probability measure, then there is complete symmetry between the two concepts, since it is easy to define a conditioned probability measure in terms of an absolute probability measure and vice versa. On the contrary, it is possible to define a comparative absolute probability by moving from a comparative conditioned probability, but the converse is impossible. For this reason it has been maintained​[14]​ that the former is an epistemologically primary concept with respect to the latter. Here in our opinion there is confusion between the logical and the epistemological level. The fact that absolute comparative probability is logically simpler does not mean that it is also epistemologically simpler. It seems to me that in general absolute probability is no other than an elliptic probability. As far as we know, among the scholars of comparative probability, only Koopman (1940) considers conditioned probabilities as primary, in accordance with the general perspective of Keynes, 1921, § 1.3.

12. Now we shall look again at the problem of comparability. As mentioned above, all standard axiomatizations of comparative probability presuppose comparability between all sentences of the language considered​[15]​. Moreover most of these approaches concern the problem of compatibility between qualitative axioms and the introduction of additivity​[16]​. We mentioned above that the comparability proposed by Keynes is too weak, since when relative frequencies with a certain weight are available, a comparison between them can be affirmed. For this reason it is impossible to establish a priori a necessary and sufficient principle of comparability. But if we leave aside relative frequencies, comparability could be strengthened in the following way:

Sufficient principle of comparability: at least one between  and ; and one between  and .

That is, given a certain evidence c, it is always possible to compare the probabilities of two different hypotheses a and b; and, given a certain hypothesis a, it is always possible to compare the probabilities ascribed to it by two different evidences b and c. But, if the evidence and/or the hypothesis are not the same, it is not certain that a comparative evaluation of the probabilities can be provided. Note that this is a sufficient principle of comparability; i.e. all probabilities of this kind must be comparable, but it does not exclude that there are other probabilities which are comparable.
Let us call “homogeneous” two probabilities which have either the same hypothesis or the same evidence; otherwise they are “inhomogeneous”. Then we can paraphrase the sufficient principle of comparability by saying that homogeneous probabilities are always comparable; but the same does not generally hold for inhomogeneous probabilities. For instance, the probability that Caesar conquered Gallia given the content of De bello gallico is greater than the probability that Caesar conquered Gallia given the content of De bello civili (provided that De bello gallico is unknown); moreover, the probability that Caesar conquered Gallia given the content of De bello gallico is greater than the probability that Brutus plotted against Caesar given the content of De bello gallico (provided that Svetonius’ Life of Caesar is unknown).




For the transitivity of the probability relation, it follows that . It is clear that the two inhomogeneous probabilities p(a/c) and p(b/d) have a sort of middle term, i.e. p(b/c); but it is easy to imagine a long chain of such intermediations, which would imply comparability of the majority of pairs of probabilities. 

13. In the formal systems of comparative probability the following proposition holds:

If  then 

Where with “0” we mean the probability of any contradiction; whereas with “1” we mean the probability of any logical truth. 
Indeed, if the hypothesis holds, the thesis follows from . In other words, if b favours a, then b is relevant for a. The converse does not hold, as showed by the following counterexample. If the probability of arriving at school on time when leaving home at 8 o’clock is greater than 0, it is not always true that the probability of arriving at school on time when leaving home at 8 o’clock is greater than that of arriving on time without leaving at 8 o’clock. Indeed it is better to leave at 7.50.




In other words, if b is indifferent for a, then it is also irrelevant for a. For instance we can arrive at a road junction such that the probability of falling down a slope is positive and equal in both routes. Neither, a fortiori, does the converse of this proposition hold.
In sum, six epistemologically different degrees of cognition can be identified:






 certitude (not only logical truth)

Note that if b is relevant for a, this does not mean that it might not be an unfavourable evidence for a. Moreover, if b is an unfavourable evidence for a, the latter might be impossible. Finally, if a is a probable hypothesis with respect to the evidence b, it is not certain that b is favourable to a. 

14. Although the above-mentioned principle of necessary comparability is too strong, it is assumed in order to investigate the problem of initial probabilities. Hence there are two kinds of initial comparative judgements: those with the same evidence and those with the same hypothesis. Following Keynes, 1921, § IV.14, let us call the first “preference judgements” and the second “relevance judgements”. When a relevance judgement is an equality, let us call it an “irrelevance judgement”. And when a preference judgement is an equality, let us call it an “indifference judgement”:

    (1)











Thereafter let us order c according to the relevance for the hypothesis b. Let us assume that there are also M elements of c relevant for b — not necessarily the same as in the case of a. If these conditions hold, then in order for the indifference judgement (1) to hold, it is sufficient that for each ci (1iM) relevant for a there is an element cj (1jM) belonging to c — not necessarily different — which is equally relevant for b. The correspondence between ci and cj must be injective.

In other terms, for (1) to be true, it is sufficient that for each ci such that  there is a cj (different for each different ci) such that:

   (2)

To sum up, we have taken indifference judgements of type (1) back to more elementary judgements of type (2).
Moreover hypothesis a and b must be indivisible​[17]​. 

We say that a hypothesis h is indivisible in the language Z when there are not two sentences k and m belonging to Z, such that , and for both there is at least one relevant sentence in Z. That is, if  for each x must be:

 and/or     (3)

Therefore it is possible to trace the notion of divisibility back to the evaluation of elementary judgements of irrelevance. It should be emphasised that this notion of indivisibility is efficacious only if the language Z is sufficiently rich. Indeed if we artificially limit the language Z so that there are no sentences k and m such that  and (3) is violated, but conceptually this division is possible, then the notion of indivisibility becomes useless.
Hence, it is possible to evaluate indifference judgements of the form (1) if it is possible to evaluate elementary judgements of type (2) and irrelevance judgements of type (3). 

15. Judgements of form (1) are very important because they are the core of the celebrated “principle of indifference”, which in a context of comparative probability assumes the following form:

Comparative indifference principle: if there are reasons not to prefer any indivisible hypothesis ai of a set a1...an, with respect to the available evidence b, then we can reasonably hold that p(a1/b)=p(a2/b)=........=p(an/b).

If a and b are indivisible, we avoid the well known paradoxes due to the unequal division of the possibilities space. In Chapter IV of his Treatise, Keynes discusses this problem extensively. Of course, the language in which the sentences whose probability concerns us are to be expressed must be large enough to admit indivisible sentences that are actually equipossible. Indeed it is easy to introduce limitations in the expressive capacity of the language, so that it is not reasonable for indivisible hypotheses to be equiprobable. 
As mentioned above, evaluations of type (1) are based on judgements of type (2) and (3). How are such evaluations possible? Keynes​[18]​ presupposes an intrinsic capacity of human understanding to evaluate a priori elementary judgements of forms (2) and (3). In the next paragraph we follow a different track.

16. Following Strevens (1998) who unconsciously rediscovers some ideas​[19]​ expressed by von Kries, 1886, and going against Keynes, 1921, § VII.8, who blames von Kries for “physical bias”, we state that elementary judgements of forms (2) and (3) could find their justification in the symmetrical character of the physical system being considered. As maintained by Franklin (2001), the fact that there are reasons for choosing initial probabilities does not mean that these reasons must be of logical character, as believed by Keynes (1921), and above all by Carnap (1950). As shown by Festa (1993), it is possible to determine initial probabilities on the basis of the cognitive context in which we are operating. As mentioned above and according to Verbraak (1990) and Castell (1998), the indifference judgements which appear in the principle of indifference do not have the following negative form:

there are no reasons for choosing one hypothesis rather than another.

Instead they have the following positive form:

there are reasons for not choosing one hypothesis rather than another.

These reasons are based on the symmetry of the context of investigation. In this perspective, it is possible to talk about a true naturalization of the indifference principle. Paraphrasing a sagacious remark of Bartha and Johns (2001, p. 110), we can say that the principle of indifference is to the probability calculus as the red light district to our big cities; they have always been there and they will always be there, but they will never be altogether respectable.

17. Now we will show that in the context of comparative probability it is not possible to formulate certain celebrated paradoxes due to reparametrization which fatally affect the quantitative indifference principle. 
Let  be the probability that the length l of the segment S is between 0 (excluded) and 0.5 (included) cm given the evidence a. Then we can say that:

    (4)





which is clearly false.
But (4) is not a suitable indifference judgement, because it is not indivisible. Therefore we have to reformulate it in the following way:

      (4’)





Then, taking the square on both sides:

    (5’)

where  and . (5’) would obviously be false, but since the probability is not additive, it is not possible to integrate it, i.e. (5’) is not deducible within the formalism of comparative probability.





provided that a and b are indivisible.
Nevertheless the comparative principle of indifference is not enough to satisfy the above-mentioned principle of comparability, according to which all homogeneous relations of probability can be evaluated. We already know that this principle is too strong. Nonetheless we can enlarge the extension of the comparable probability relations on the basis of the following statement:









This principle enables us to evaluate many comparative probabilities from relative frequencies (provided that the frequencies have enough weight), so that many other probability relations — different from indifference judgements based on physical symmetry — become evaluable. Note that the comparative principal principle seems epistemologically more reasonable than the standard one, which assumes an identity between the relative frequency and the rational degree of belief. 
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^1	  A first version of this paper has been improved by Margherita Benzi’s comments.
^2	  See above all Franklin, 2001.
^3	  Runde (1994) favours this perspective.
^4	  Strevens, 1998 moves in the same research direction.
^5	  At least when the gravitational field is not too intensive.
^6	  Keynes, 1921, p. 23.
^7	  Ibid., pp. 30-31.
^8	  Ibid., p. 42.
^9	  Ibid., p. 70.
^10	  See above all Fine, 1973 and Koopman, 1940.
^11	  This is a formalization of the concept introduced by Keynes, 1921, § V.2.
^12	  I apologise for the Welsh!
^13	  This counterexample was suggested to me by Angelo Vistoli, who read a first version of this paper providing me with decisive observations.
^14	  Fine, 1973, pp. 30-31.
^15	  De Finetti, 1931, Koopman, 1940, Fine, 1973, Fishburn, 1986.
^16	  See also the recent papers of Coletti and Scozzafava, 2001, Hardy, 2002. An important exception is Fine and Valley, 1979.
^17	  The notion of “indivisible” appears in Keynes, 1921, § IV.21 as well, but it is defined in an unsatisfactory way.
^18	  Keynes, 1921, § V.5.
^19	  His point of view was recently reformulated by Heidelberger, 2001.
